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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Trent M.G. Petersen appeals from the district court's order relinquishing
jurisdiction.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinas
Petersen issued 14 insufficient funds checks during June and July 2007
for goods and services worth over $1500.00. (R., p. 21; PSI, p. 2.) The state
charged him with two felony counts of Issuing Insufficient Fund Checks. (R., pp.
20-21.) Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, Petersen pled guilty to one

count of Issuing Insufficient Fund Checks and the other count was dismissed.
(R., pp. 38-39.)

On August 18, 2008, Petersen was sentenced to a unified

sentence of three years with one year determinate. (R., pp. 49-52.) The court
retained jurisdiction for 180 days pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601(4). (R., pp. 50-51.)
Due to proceedings in seveial other ciises in other coiinties, Petersen
never attended the rider program at the Department of Correction. (R., pp. 5458; Tr., p. 43, L. 4

- p. 44,

L. 15.) On February 25, 2009, 191 days after the

court retained jurisdiction, the district court decided that, due to Petersen never
attending his rider, that it would utilize the additional 30 days provision of I.C. §
19-2604(4). (R., p. 54.) The district court ordered:

The Court's jurisdiction in this matter ends on February 7, 2009, at
which time the Defendant must be brought before the Court for a
rider review. However, due to the defendant being sent to
Bonnevilie County and not on his rider as ordered by the Court and
miscalculation of retained jurisdiction time, the Court, in its
discretion and pursuant to the authority conferred upon the Court

by I.C. 19-2601(4), extends the period of retained jurisdiction for
thirty (30) days, in order to properly dispose of this matter. Id.
(R., p. 54.) Thereafter, the district court issued an order to transport Petersen to
Elmore County for a hearing to be held on March 2, 2009. (R., p. 56.)
On March 2, 2009, 196 days after the court retained jurisdiction, Petersen
returned to Elmore County for his review hearing. (R., pp. 58-60.) At that
hearing, the state asserted that the district court lost jurisdiction upon expiration
of the initial 180 day term. (Tr., p. 49, L. 18 - p. 50, L. 15.) The defense argued
that the district court could retain jurisdiction in the matter for the additional 30
days.

(Tr., p. 45, Ls. 4-24.)

The district court concluded that it had lost

jurisdiction over Petersen but set the matter for a second hearing to give the
state and defense adequate time to brief the issue. (Tr., p. 46, L. 12 - p. 52, L.
25.)
A second hearing was held on March 16, 2009, 210 days after Petersen's
sentencing. (R., p. 74.) At that hearing, the state 2nd defense aigued theii
respective positions. (Tr., p. 56, L. 5 - p. 60, L. 19; p. 61, L. 1 - p. 62, L. 6.)
Ultimately, the district court concluded:
But I don't believe that a statute that says your jurisdiction
expires at 180 days unless you extend your jurisdiction allows you
to go to [the 18Ist] day and then extend your jurisdiction beyond
that time. I think you have to make that determination within the
180 day period.
From my standpoint, this Court would love to have the law
say that yes, that if you receive it any time within 210 days you can
act. But I don't think that's what the law is unless the Supreme
Court wants to rule that way. And until they do I think I'm bound by
the fact that the jurisdiction expired at 180 days. When jurisdiction
expires it expires. I no longer have the authority to enter any order
in this case. The defendant is in the custody of the Idaho

Department of Corrections. So based upon that the Court will
relinquish its jurisdiction.

(Tr., p. 65, L. 15-p.66, L.20.)
The district court entered its order relinquishingjurisdiction on March 17,
2009. (R., pp. 76-79.) in that order, the district court explained:
The Court found that due to the defendant being held in Eastern
ldaho during the entire time of his rider and that the Court not being
advised of this fact by the State, the defendant, defense counsel, or
Eastern ldaho authorities until after the period of 180 days during
which the Court retained jurisdiction that even though the March 16,
2009 date would represent 210 days from the date the Court
retained jurisdiction had the Court exercised its power to retain
jurisdiction for an additional 30 days that no request having been
made before the initial period of 180 days had expired that the
Court had no jurisdiction to extend jurisdiction by 30 days either
upon it's own motion or upon motion of the parties and thus
jurisdiction was relinquished by operation of law.
(R., pp. 76-77.)
The following day, Petersen filed a motion to reduce his sentence
pursuant to Rule 35 (R., pp. 80-81), which was denied by the district court
without a hearing (R., pp. 115-18). Petersen timely appealed the court's order
relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp. 82-85.)

ISSUES

Petersen states the issues on appeal as:
Whether the district court retained juilsdiction, or otherwise
retained the authority, to place Mr. Petersen on probation within
thirty (30) days after the purported expiration of the initial 180 days
of the statutory period of retained jurisdiction.
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Petersen failed to show that the district court erred when it concluded
that its jurisdiction ended by operation of law upon the expiration of the initial 180
day period of retained jurisdiction?

ARGUMENT
Petersen Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It
Relincluished His Jurisdiction U ~ o Expiration
n
Of His Initial 180 Day Period Of
Retained Jurisdiction
A.

Introduction
Petersen asserts that the district court erred when it determined that it lost

jurisdiction to place Petersen on probation after his initial 180 day period of
retained jurisdiction expired. (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Petersen's argument is
three-fold. First, he argues that because the statute grants a district court the
power to extend jurisdiction for an additional 30 days the district court did not
lose jurisdiction after the initial 180 day period of retained jurisdiction expired.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-17.) This argument fails, however, because the plain
language of the statute requires the court to exercise its extended jurisdiction
prior to the expiration of the original 180 day period. Next, Petersen argues that
the district court retained the "inherent authority" to place him on probation even
though the court's statutory jurisdiction had expired. (Appellant's brief, pp. 1719.) Finally, Petersen asserts that the district court had the authority to place him
on probation because Petersen was never actually taken into the custody of the
Department of Correction and, thus, the statutory period of retained jurisdiction
never ran. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-22.) These arguments are also without
merit.
B.

Standard of Review
The construction and application of a statute presents a question of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Robinson, 143

ldaho 306, 307, 142 P.3d 729, 730 (2006); State v. Schwartz, 139 ldaho 360,
362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). "Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of
law that may be raised at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free
review." State v. Jones, 140 ldaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) (citation
omitted).
C.

The District Court Prooerlv Concluded That It Did Not Have Jurisdiction To
Place Petersen On Probation More Than 180 Days Afier His Initial Term
Of Retained Jurisdiction Expired
It is a well-settled principle of ldaho law that, absent a specific grant of

authority, a district court's jurisdiction to alter an otherwise lawful sentence
terminates upon execution of the sentence by the transfer of the defendant to the
board of correction.

State v. Johnson, 75 ldaho 157, 161, 269 P.2d 769,

771 (1954); State v. Williams, 126 ldaho 39, 43, 878 P.2d 213, 217 (Ct. App.
1994). ldaho Code § 19-2601(4) contains such a specific grant of authority. It
authorizes a district court to retain jiiiisdiciion over a defendant who has been
convicted and sentenced to a period of incarceration in the custody of fhe board
of correction. It reads, in relevant part:
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a
plea of guilty, in any district court of the state of ldaho, of or to any
crime against the laws of the state, except those of treason or
murder, the court in its discretion, may:
4.
Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time
during the first one hundred eighty (180) days of a sentence to the
custody of the state board of correction. The court shall retain
jurisdiction over the prisoner for the first one hundred eighty (180)
days or, if the prisoner is a juvenile, until the juvenile reaches
twenty-one (21) years of age. The prisoner will remain committed
to the board of correction if not affirmatively placed on probation by

the court. In extraordinary circumstances, where the court
concludes that it is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant
information within the one hundred eighty (180) day period of
retained jurisdiction, or where the court concludes that a
hearing is required and is unable to obtain the defendant's
presence for such a hearing within such period, the court may
decide whether to place the defendant on probation or release
jurisdiction within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30)
days, after the one hundred eighty (180) day period of retained
jurisdiction has expired.
I.C. § 19-2601(4) (emphasis added). By authorizing a district court to retain
jurisdiction for 180 days after the execution of sentence has been ordered, this
statute "creates an exception to the general rule that the court loses jurisdiction
from the moment execution of the sentence begins." Williams, 126 ldaho at 44,
878 P.2d at 218.
The interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words. Schwartz,
139 ldaho at 362, 79 P.3d at 721. Those words must be given their plain, usual,
and ordinary meaning and the statute must be construed as a whole.

&
! Where

the language of a staiiite is plain and uiiambigiious, :he Court iiiiist give effect to
the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode,
133 ldaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). The Court assumes that the
legislature meant what is clearly stated in the statute, "[ujnless the result is
palpably absurd."

m,133 ldaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688.

ldaho Code

3 19-2601 is plain and unambiguous. A district court's

jurisdiction is limited to the first 180 days of a sentence. If, within that first 180
days, the court does not affirmatively place the defendant on probation, the
court's jurisdiction expires and the defendant remains committed to the board of
correction. There is one exception, however, to the 180 day limitation:

In extraordinary circumstances, where the court concludes
that it is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant information
within the one hundred eighty (180) day period of retained
jurisdiction, or where the court concludes that a hearing is required
and is unable to obtain the defendant's presence for such a hearing
within such period, the court may decide whether to place the
defendant on probation or release jurisdiction within a reasonable
time, not to exceed thirty (30) days, after the one hundred eighty
(180) day period of retained jurisdiction has expired.

I.C. § 19-4901(4) (emphasis added). This sentence was added to the statute in
2005 but did not otherwise change the statute as originally written.

The

amendment uses the present tense "is" rather than the past tense "was" to show
that the district court must make the determination of extraordinary
circumstances prior to the initial expiration of retained jurisdiction.

Thus, the

plain language of the statute requires the court to conclude, prior to the expiration
of the 180 period, that extraordinary circumstances exist and that it is unable to
obtain and evaluate the relevant information within the 180 day period of retained
jurisdiction or that it is unable to obtain the defendant's presence within the $80
day period.

In either event, the district court must make the finding before

expiration of the original 180 day period. The district court does not have the
ability to make this finding afferthe 180 day period because it has lost jurisdiction
and no longer has the power to make any findings.
In his argument, Petersen utterly ignores the clause in the statute that lists
the circumstances in which a court can extend jurisdiction for an additional 30
days.

(See, Appellant's

brief, pp. 9-10.) This clause reads: "where the court

concludes that it is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant information within
the one hundred eighty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction, or where the

court concludes that a hearing is required and is unable to obtain the defendant's
presence for such a hearing within such period ...." It is a fundamental principle
of statutory interpretation that a statute must be construed so that effect is given
to every word, clause and sentence of the statute. Athav v. Stacey, 142 ldaho
360, 365, 128 P.3d 897, 902 (2005); State v. Baer, 132 ldaho 416, 417-18, 973
P.3d 768, 769-70 (Ct. App. 1999). Here, by pretending that it does not exist,
Petersen is asking this court to simply ignore the plain language of the statute.
When this clause is included, Petersen's interpretation of the statute is
illogical. It makes no sense to require the district court to conclude that it either
cannot obtain or evaluate relevant information or obtain the Defendant's
presence within the I 8 0 day period, if such decisions were permitted to be made
after the initial 180 day period expired. The statute would have necessarily used
different language if such was the case. The plain language of the statute
requires the extension of jurisdiction for "extraordinary purposes" to be made
prior to the expiration of the initial 180 day retained jurisdiction period.
Even if the district court could retain jurisdiction after the initial expiration
of 180 period of retained jurisdiction, the district court found that "extraordinary
circumstances" did not exist that would require the use of the additional 30 day
period. It ruled:
It has to be extraordinary circumstances.
It has to be - I just can't believe that the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court would hold that the fact that the Court was
not advised by either the State or the Defense of the fact that this
period of time was running and the defendant had not yet been sent
on a rider would meet those extraordinary circumstances
requirements.

(Tr., p. 51,L. 20 - p. 52, L. 3.)
In addition, the statute requires the district court to either find that it cannot
obtain and evaluate relevant information within the 180 day period of retained
jurisdiction or where the court concludes that a hearing is required and is unable
to obtain the defendant's presence for such a hearing within such period. I.C.
19-2601(4). Here, the court made neither of these findings. Thus, Petersen's
period of retained jurisdiction expired 180 days after he was initially placed on
retained jurisdiction.
Because the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no reason to
examine its legislative history. However, a review of the legislative history does
not support Petersen's position. The statement of purpose reads, in part:
This bill would provide that a court that has retained
jurisdiction may place a defendant on probation after the 180-day
period has expired only where extraordinary circumstances exist
that prevent the court from obtaining needed information or
securing the defendant's prssence fcjr a hearing. Even then, the
180-day period could be extended only for 30 days. This would
resolve the existing uncertainty in the law and provide some leeway
for sentencing courts in the small number of cases where such
extraordinary circumstances are present.
2005 House Bill 204, Statement of Purpose (attached as Appendix A). Clearly,
the statute was amended to grant more flexibility to sentencing courts. However,
the statement of purpose does not address when 'the district court must
determine if extraordinary circumstances exist which justify an extension of
jurisdiction, which is the sole issue in this appeal.

Rather, the statement of

purpose simply acknowledges that there are circumstances where an extension
may be necessary.

Finally, Petersen asserts that public policy considerations support his
interpretation of the statute. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-17.) Petersen argues that
placing appropriate offenders on probation is a significant state interest and that
"providing sentencing courts an additional thirty (30) days to review relevant
material that could not otherwise be reviewed, or to obtain the presence of a
defendant who otherwise could not be present, the legislature has increased the
likelihood that appropriate offenders will in fact receive probation." (Appellant's
brief, p. 14.) Because the statute is plain and unambiguous, it is not necessary
to examine the public policy behind the statute. Undoubtedly, the public policy
behind the amendment to the statute was to permit sentencing courts more
flexibility. However, nothing that Petersen has cited or argued requires a finding
contrary to the plain language of the statute that requires the district court to
make its decision prior to expiration of the original 180 day retained jurisdiction
period.
The plain language of the statute requires the court to conclude, prior to
the expiration of the 180 period, that extraordinary circumstances exist and that it
is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant information within the 180 days
period of retained jurisdiction or that it is unable to obtain the defendant's
presence within the 180 day period. Thus, the district court lost jurisdiction over
Petersen upon expiration of the initial 180 day period and did not err in
concluding that he was unable to extend Petersen's jurisdiction for an additional
30 days.

D.

Petersen's Claim That The District Court Retained Inherent Authority
Throuqh The ldaho Constitution To Place Petersen On Probation Is
Without Merit
Petersen asserts that even if the district court's statutory jurisdiction had

expired, that the court still possessed inherent authority to place him on probation
pursuant to Article II, Section 1 and Article V, Section 13 of the ldaho
Constitution. (Appellant's brief, p. 17.) However, the ldaho Supreme Court has
consistently held that a sentencing court is vested only with authority granted to it
by the legislature. State v. Funk, 123 ldaho 967, 969, 855 P.2d 52, 54 (1993)

(citinq State v. McCoy, 94 ldaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (1971)). The only "power"
district courts have to retain jurisdiction over a defendant is granted by I.C. § 192601(4). State v. Williams, 126 ldaho 39, 43, 878 P.2d 213,217 (Ct. App. 1994)
("A district court's authority to retain jurisdiction over a convicted defendant who
has been sentenced to the custody of the Board derives from I.C. § 192601(4)"); State v. Taylor, 142 tdaho 30, 31, 121 P.3d 961, 962 (2005); State v.

D
&
,

140 ldaho 238, 240, 91 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Ct. App. 2004). Once the

period of retained jurisdiction authorized by I.C. § 19-2601(4) expires, and the
district court has failed to affirmatively place the defendant on probation, the
district court no longer has the "power" to do so.
In arguing that the district court had "inherent authority" to place Petersen
on probation, Petersen cites State v. Griffith, 140 ldaho 616, 618-19, 97 P.3d
483, 485-86 (Ct. App. 2004). (Appellant's brief, p. 18.) However, his reliance on

Griffith is misplaced.

In

m,the court of appeals addressed a district court's

ability to set aside a judgment that was obtained by fraud. There is no allegation

that Petersen's judgment was obtained by fraud, and Petersen claims no fraud.
Rather, he advocates for a standard whereby the court may exercise inherent
jurisdiction to reopen cases and to suspend sentences in appropriate cases.
(Appellant's brief, p. 19.) The state submits that there is no legal basis for such a
broad expansion of the court's powers; such an expansion would eviscerate the
legal doctrines protecting finality of judgment and the general rule that a final
judgment brings a court's jurisdiction to a close. Thus, Petersen's argument is
without legal merit.
Petersen's reliance on State v. McCoy, 94 ldaho 236, 486 P.2d 247
(1971) (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-19), is likewise misplaced. In McCoy, the ldaho
Supreme Court was asked to review a statute which required a mandatory
minimum sentence of ten days jail time for driving under the influence of alcohol.
McCoy, 94 ldaho at 237, 486 P.2d at 248. The magistrate in that case had
imposed the ten-day sentence and then suspended it and ptaced the defendant
on probation.

The state appealed, and the Supreme Court held that the

mandatory minimum sentence requirement violated article 5, section 13 of the
ldaho Constitution because it invaded the judiciary's inherent authority to
suspend sentences.

ld.94 ldaho at 240,486 P.2d at 251.

The Supreme Court

focused its decision on the powers that a sentencing court had at common law,
and its ability at common law to suspend a sentence and place an individual on
probation at senfencing.'

94 ldaho at 238-40, 486 P.2d at 249-51. Here,

' In response to McCoy, the state constitution was subsequently amended to
specifically provide that "the legislature can provide mandatory minimum
sentences" which cannot be reduced. ldaho Const., Art. V, 3 13.

Petersen was already sentenced to a term in the custody the Department of
Correction. He is asking this court to grossly expand the "inherent powers" of the
district court to include his post-sentencing situation, but has provided no legal
basis to do so. Thus, his argument is without merit.
E.

The District Court Lost Jurisdiction To Place Petersen On Probation
Because The Statutory Period Of Retained Jurisdiction Had Run Even
Thouaht Petersen Was Not In The Actual Phvsical Custodv Of The
Department Of Correction
Finally, Petersen asserts that the district court never lost jurisdiction to

place him on probation because the $80-day period of concurrent jurisdiction is
triggered only upon the Department of Correction taking actual custody of an
offender.

(Appellant's brief, p. 19.)

This argument is also without merit.

Petersen did not need to be physically transferred to the Department of
Correction prior to 180 day period of retained jurisdiction commencing.
The sentencing court, in its discretion, may: "Suspend the execution of the
judgment at any time during the first T80 days of a sentence to the custody
of the state board of correction. The court shall retain jurisdiction over the
prisoner for the first one hundred eighty (180) days ...." I.C. § 19-2601(4)
(emphasis added). The district court suspended the execution of Petersen's
judgment at his sentencing on August 18, 2008.

When an individual is

sentenced to the custody of the Board of Correction, his term of confinement
begins from the day of his sentence. I.C. 5 20-209A. Because Petersen started
sewing his "sentence to the custody of the state board of correction" upon the

issuance of his sentence, the 180 day period of retained jurisdiction commenced
immediately upon sentencing.
Petersen cites State v. McGoniaal, 122 ldaho 939, 842 P.2d 275 (1992),
for the proposition that the district court retained the authority to place him on
probation because he was never physically remanded to the custody of the
Department of Correction.

However, McGoniaal is inapposite to this case.

McGonigai, immediately after being sentenced, threatened a police officer and
the judge. McGoniaal, 122 ldaho at 940, 842 P.2d at 276. That afternoon, the
court recalled the case, withdrew the sentence and imposed a new one.

Id. On

appeal, McGonigal asserted that the district court did not have jurisdiction to
increase his sentence.

Id. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the court

had jurisdiction to resentence him because he had not yet been placed in the
custody of the Department of Correction.

Id. Here, the issue is whether the 180

day jurisdictional period of I.C. § 19-2601(4) had run, an issue never raised, and
irrelevant to the issue actually raised, in McGoniqal. I.C. § 19-2601(4) does not
grant jurisdiction based on physical custody, but rather during "the first 180 days
of a sentence." There is no legal basis for the broad expansion of the holding of
McGoni~alrequested by Petersen and such an expansion is against the plain
language of the statute. Thus, his argument is without merit.
Petersen's position is also not supported by State v. Williams, 126 ldaho
39, 878 P.2d 213 (Ct. App. 1994). The issue in Williams was whether the district
court had the authority to retain jurisdiction upon revocation of the defendant's
probation. Williams, 126 ldaho at 43, 878 P.2d at 217. The court of appeals

concluded that the district court had such power.

Id.,126 ldaho at 44, 878 P.2d

at 218. Unlike Williams, Petersen was not placed on probation prior to the district
court retaining jurisdiction and the holding of Williams is irrelevant to Petersen's
situation.
Petersen relies upon the cases cited in dicta in Williams: McGoniaai
(discussed supra) and State v. Johnson, 101 ldaho 581,618 P.2d 759 (1980), in
support of his contention that his retained jurisdiction did not automatically expire
by operation of law because he was not in the custody of the Board of
Correction. However, neither of these cases support his assertion. In Johnson,
the defendant was given the opportunity to get his affairs in order prior to
reporting to prison and fled. Johnson, 101 ldaho at 582-83, 618 P.2d at 760-61.
Upon his recapture and return to court, the district court increased his sentence.
Id., 101 ldaho at 585, 618 P.2d at 763.
-

The Supreme Court held that the district

court had jurisdiction to impose a greater sentence because he had not
commenced sewing his original sentence.

Id.

Unlike Johnson, Petersen had

commenced serving his original sentence and has given no reason to expand the
holding of: Johnson to his situation.
Under the plain language of the statute, Petersen's period of retained
jurisdiction commenced upon his sentencing and expired 180 days later.
Whether he was placed in the actual physical custody of the Department of
Correction is irrelevant under the plain language of the statute.

Thus, his

argument that his 180 day period of retained jurisdiction never began to run
because he was never in the physical custody of the board of correction and

therefore, his jurisdiction was not relinquished by operation of law, is without
merit. The district court did not err in relinquishing jurisdiction after more than
180 days had passed since Petersen's sentencing.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
relinquishing jurisdiction and ordering the underlying sentence executed.
DATED this 27th day of April, 2010.
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AN ACT
RELATING TO COURT JURISDICTION; AMENDING SECTION 19-2601, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE THAT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES THE COURT MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO
PLACE A DEFENDANT ON PROBATION OR RELEASE JURISDICTION WITHIN A REASONABLE
TIME AFTER THE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY DAY PERIOD OF RETAINED JURISDICTION HAS
EXPIRED.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Section 19-2601, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby
amended to read as follows:
19-2601. COMMUTATION, SUSPENSION, WITHHOLDING OF SENTENCE - - PROBATION,
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty, in
any district court of the state of Pdaho, of or to any crime against the laws
of the state, except those of treason.or murder, the court in its discretion,
may :
1. Commute the sentence and confine the defendant in the county jail, or,
if the defendant is of proper age, commit the defendant to the custody of the
state department of juvenile corrections; or
2. Suspend the execution of the judgment at the time of judgment or at
any time during the term of a sentence in the county jail and place the
defendant on probation under such terms and conditions as it deems necessary
and expedient; or
3. Withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe
and may place the defendant on probation; or
Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first one
4.
hundred eighty (180) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of
correction. The court shall retain jurisdiction over the prisoner for the
first one hundred eighty (180) days or, if the prisoner is a juvenile, until
the juvenile reaches twenty-one (21) years of age. The prisoner will remain
committed to the hoard of correction if not affirmatively placed on probation
by the court. In extraordinam circumstances, where the court concludes that
it is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant information within the one
hundred eiqhty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction, or where the court
concludes that a hearinq is required and is unable to obtain the defendant's
presence for such a hearinq within such period, the court may decide whether
to place the defendant on probation or release jurisdiction within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30).,days,after the one hundred eighty (180)
day period of retained iurisdiction:has expired. Placement on probation shall
be under such terms and conditions as the court deems necessary and expedient.
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The court in its discretion may sentence a defendant to more than one (1)
period of retained jurisdiction after a defendant has been placed on probation
in a case. In no case shall the board of correction or its agent, the department of correction, be required to hold a hearing of any kind with respect to
a recommendation to the court for the grant or denial of probation. Probation

. .

is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court. Any recommendation made
by the department to the court regarding the prisoner shall be in the nature
of an addendum to the presentence report. The board of correction and its
agency, the department of correction, and their employees shall not be held
financially responsible for damages, injunctive or declaratory relief for any
recommendation made to the district court under this section.
5. If the crime involved is a felony and if judgment is withheld as provided
in subsection 3. of this section or if judgment and a sentence of custody to the state board of correction is suspended at the time of judgment in
accordance with subsection 2. of this section or as provided by subsection 4.
of this section and the court shall.place the defendant upon probation, it
shall he to the board of correction; to a county juvenile probation department, or any other person or persons the court, in its discretion, deems
appropriate.
6. If the crime involved is a misdemeanor, indictable or otherwise, or if
the court should suspend any remaining portion of a jail sentence already commuted in accordance with subsection 1. of this section, the court, if it
grants probation, may place the defendant on probation. If the convicted person is a juvenile held for adult criminal proceedings, the court may order
probation under the supervision of the county's juvenile probation department.
7. The period of probation ordered by a court under this section under a
conviction or plea of guilty for a misdemeanor, indictable or otherwise, may
be for a period of not more than two (2) years; and under a conviction or plea
of guilty for a felony the period of probation may be for a period of not more
than the maximum period for which the defendant might have been imprisoned.

I

Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Impact
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

I
I

This bill is intended to resolve the uncertainty that now exists as to
when a sentencing court can make a decisidn.as to whether to place a
defendant on probation following a period105 retained jurisdiction.
Idaho Code 0 19-2601(4) provides that a sentencing court can retain
jurisdiction over a defendant for 180 days, and that at any time
during that period the court may place the defendant on probation. In
State v. Diggie, 140 Idaho 238, 91 P.3d 1142 (Ct. App. 2004), the
Court of Appeals reaffirmed that a sentencing court loses jurisdiction
over a defendant and may no longer place the defendant on probation
when the 180-day period expires. The Court went on to say, however,
"We deem it unnecessary to hold in this case that a sentencing court
may never make a decision to place a defendant on probation within a
reasonable time after the 180-day period of retained jurisdiction has
expired where extraordinary circumstances exist that may explain or
justify court action beyond the statutorily established period." 91
P.3d at 1145.

I

This bill would provide that a court that has retained jurisdiction
may place a defendant on probation after the 180-day period has
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expired only where extraordinary circumstances exist that prevent the
court from obtaining needed information or securing the defendant's
presence for a hearing. Even then, the 180-day period could be
extended only for 30 days. This would resolve the existing
uncertainty in the law and provide some leewa$for sentencing courts
in the small number of cases where such ekt'raordinary circumstances
are present.
I

FISCAL NOTE

i

This bill would have no impact on the general fund.

Contact Person:
I

1

Patricia Tobias
Administrative Director of the Courts
(208)

334-2246
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